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ARTICLE EIGHT: A PREMISE AND
THREE PROBLEMS
Ernest L. Folk, Ill*
HIS essay concerns itself with a basic premise and three problems
concerning investment securities under Article Eight of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code). Although some amount of relevant
exposition is necessary to make the arguments intelligible, general
familiarity with the essentials of the Code's treatment of investment
securities is assumed.1

T

I. THE

NEGOTIABILITY PREMISE

Article Eight's overriding objective is to confer full negotiability
upon all investment securities, as shown by section 8-105's avowal
that "securities governed by this article are negotiable instruments."2
While Article Eight represents the embodiment of pre-existing law,
it also makes several important changes. Prior to the Code, no single
statute governed all investment securities. Although shares of stock
were implicitly made negotiable by the Uniform Stock Transfer Act,
the status of many bonds, which were subject to the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL), remained in doubt. This was so because bonds are often made payable only out of designated funds
(such as, municipal bonds) or from earnings (income bonds), both of
which violate the NIL requirement that a promise to pay be unconditional, 3 while other bonds which, on their face, bear an unconditional promise to pay are often accompanied by trust indentures to
• Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A.B. 1952, Roanoke;
LL.B. 1956, Virginia; M.A. 1958, Virginia.-Ed. I am deeply grateful to Professor Alfred
F. Conard of the University of Michigan Law School for the opportunity to have discussed many Article Eight issues and questions with him and for his reading of this
article in manuscript.
1. Writings dealing more specifically with exposition include Folk, Article Eight:
Investment Securities, 44 N.C.L. REv. 654 (1966), and two excellent articles by Carlos
Israels: Investment Securities as Negotiable Paper-Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 13 .Bus. LAw. 676 (1958) and Investment Securities Problems-Article 8 of
the UCC, 11 How. L.J. 120 (1965).
2. Uniform Commercial Code § 8-105 (hereinafter cited as U.C.C.J. It is interesting
to note how this section dovetails with some state "legal investment statutes" which permit investment only in securities which are "negotiable instruments." See Israels, Investment Securities in New York: Statutory Text and Commercial Practice, 48 CORNELL L.Q.
108, 112 (1962).
3. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 1(2) [hereinafter cited as N.I.L.J. Compare U.C.C. § 3-104(l)(b). The NIL retained the common law concept that a bond must
contain an unconditional promise to pay in order to be negotiable. Most state legislatures, however, specifically conferred negotiability upon municipal, and other, bonds
payable from designated revenues, taxes or other funds despite the fact that their payment was so conditioned.
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which the bonds are declared "subject."4 Additionally, the negotiability of registered-form bonds was placed in doubt by language in
the registration provisions requiring transfer "on the books" of the
corporation which seemingly contravenes the NIL's prescribed mode
of negotiation.5 Other securities, such as equipment trust securities,
American Depositary Receipts, and interim receipts also probably
were non-negotiable prior to the Code, absent special statutes enacted
only in an occasional state.6
The near universal acclaim of Article Eight is grounded largely
on its removing these (and other) impediments to full negotiability.
In this respect, not only does Article Eight unify but it also culminates prior law by establishing broad negotiability and by viewing
all securities as sufficiently similar in character that they can properly
be governed by the same rules without distinction between equity
and creditor securities. Although the latter assumption is certainly
sound, the former and more basic premise-that all investment securities are and should be negotiable-has apparently never been seriously questioned. At this point, however, it is desirable to explore the validity of this premise in order to determine whether the
Code strikes a fair balance between the underlying, indeed conflicting, policy objectives operating in the area of investment securities.
In assessing such a policy balance, it is instructive, but not conclusive, to note that the trend has been toward negotiability of securities. The established and unquestioned negotiability of notes, and
drafts, however, need not require that investment securities, which
are substantially different from commercial paper in character and
function, also carry the capacity to extinguish defenses of the issuer
or claims of prior owners or of others having interests in the security.
The negotiability of investment securities necessarily means that,
in the event of conflict, the interests of the "true owners" 7 are subordinated to those of the purchasers. However, since securities, unlike commercial paper, are either long-term (bonds and debentures)
or permanent investments (stock and some other equity instruments),
and presumably are acquired for the long haul, it is arguable that the
4. See text accompanying notes 60-62 infra.
5. See text accompanying note 59 infra.
6. Security receipts and equipment trust certificates were declared negotiable by New
York's Hofstadter Act, N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAw § 260 (McKinney 1962).
7. Throughout this article I shall use the term "true owner" to refer to the registered owner of a security who is in possession or has the right to possession of that security. In Article Eight the term is used only in § 8-404(2); usually, the unmodified word
"owner" appears, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 8-311 8: 8-315(2). Thus defined, "true owner's" interest
in a security constitutes an "adverse claim" within the meaning of § 8-301(1) and therefore can be protected in various ways. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 8-403 8: 8-405.
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established ownership of securities merits greater protection than the
ownership of short-term commercial paper. Unhampered or undelayed circulation of investment securities is not as essential as is the
instant transferability of commercial paper which should approximate the free circulation of money. Moreover, all legitimate interests
of both sellers and buyers would be served if purchasers of securities
were obliged to observe the rights of others. Given a system of rules
premised on the maximum protection of "true owners," mechanisms
would undoubtedly be developed by which purchasers could guard
themselves against loss from defenses or adverse claims unexpectedly
asserted against them; for example, security prices might be adjusted
downward in the marketplace to reflect such uncertainties, and forms
of insurance, not easily pictured in the light of the present system,
could evolve. Nor would the purchaser inevitably suffer, at least not
in the long-run. For today's purchaser who loses out to the claim of a
true owner under this hypothesized system of rules would, as tomorrow's "true owner," possess a title to securities which could not readily
be divested by a purchaser who supposedly acquired superior rights.
Perhaps speculators unable to acquire prior rights would suffer delays
and other difficulties which would temper their enthusiasm, but this
would not necessarily be an undesirable result. We could assume
that, under such rules, securities transfers would be less swift and
certain than at present, but still be substantially faster and easier
than real estate transactions under current property laws.
A further reason which could be advanced in support of a system
premised on non-negotiability is its inherent potential for compelling
greater caution in the transfer of investment securities. Under this
hypothetical system, a purchaser, who takes the security subject necessarily to any adverse claims whether or not known or knowable,
would surely be entitled either to a clean security free of such
claims,8 or to damages. Whatever the remedy sought, the purchaser's
demand would work its way back through the buying broker and
transfer agent, and eventually come to the selling broker who handled the sale of the original tainted security. Presumably, the selling
broker would sustain a converter's liability for participating in the
wrongful transfer; therefore, he would probably insure against this
liability, while retaining rights against the seller who perpetrated the
original wrong. Or, more likely, since the market custom is for the
8. Under the existing system, compare the New York Stock Exchange "Reclamation
Rules," N.Y. Stock Exch. Rules 265-75, particularly Rule 272, permitting reclamation
at any time "by reason of the fact: (I) That title to a security is called in question ••••"
CCH N.Y.S.E. GumE 1J1J 2265-75.
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selling broker promptly to register transfer of the security out of the
seller's name and into a name acceptable for transfer under securities
exchange rules, 9 special care would be exercised at the threshold to
assure that a "clean" security goes into the market. Thus, a non-negotiability concept would compel brokers to exercise greater care than
at present to assure the integrity of transactions-a result with which
no one can quarrel.
It is evident, then, that we can establish on a premise of nonnegotiability an entirely rational system which would generously
serve important policy objectives. The questions that now must be
considered are: what major interests are promoted by the existing
system which rests on the opposite premise, and does the existing
system sufficiently protect the "true owner."
Unfettered negotiability of securities reflects the custom and practice of the investment community which regards the principles that
purchasers prevail over "true owners" and that issuer defenses be
extinguished by the sale as indispensable to swift, easy, and standardized transactions. Clearly, the purchaser can be more confident if he
knows he will not be bound by defenses and claims of which he is
ignorant and, further, that he need not search them out. Hence, from
the purchaser's standpoint, the reliability of securities transactions is
increased. Moreover, the very fact that the purchasers are thus favored benefits the true owners as well, since they now know that they
can sell their securities in a market which is broader, more certain,
and better able to absorb their offerings; indeed, the existence of this
ready market stabilizes and perhaps enhances the value of securities
which are merely held as well as those which are sold. Thus, negotiability both promotes and reflects the quality of the market for investment securities.
Another consideration is that "true owners" and issuers are in the
best position to protect their own interests. The issuer, for instance,
can simply comply with all of the legal requirements when creating
a security and thus obviate any need to assert "defenses" based on
invalidity under statute or charter; 10 just as it can minimize the oncecommon risk of irresponsible employees issuing securities to themselves for personal gain.11 "True owners" of securities can also best
protect their interests: they can avoid indorsing securities and thereby
9. See N. Y. Stock Exch. Rules 199-201, CCH N.Y.S.E. GUIDE ,J,J 2199-201.
10. The two principal provisions on issuer defenses are U.C.C. §§ 8·202 &: 8-215.
11. See, e.g., Hudson Trust Co. v. American Linseed Co., 232 N.Y. 350, 134 N.E. 178
(1922); Jarvis v. Manhattan Beach Co., 148 N.Y. 652, 43 N.E. 68 (1896); Havens v. Bank
of Tarboro, 132 N.C. 214, 43 S.E. 639 (1903). U.C.C. § 8-205 adopts the rule that the
signature of a transfer agent, registrar, authenticating trustee or any of their employees
"entrusted with the responsible handling of the security" will bind the issuer.
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prevent thieves and unauthorized persons from passing title; 12 they
can select honest, reliable, and bonded fiduciaries13 and can bring to
account trustees who ·wrongfully transfer securities; and when securities are lost or stolen, they can invoke standardized procedures to
protect their interests. 14 Thus, the greater ability of "true owners"
and issuers to minimize the risk of loss or harm to all concerned in
large part supports the negotiability rule. In contrast to the "true
owners" and issuers, purchasers are poorly situated to protect against
such risks, particularly in the impersonal transactions on organized
markets involving securities which are today viewed as fungible. 15
Even further, I suggest that underlying all the arguments in support of negotiability there lies an unarticulated policy favoring the
ready circulation of securities, as against the stagnancy of unchanged
ownership. Policy seemingly favors the continuous, on-going process
of exchanging property-for the myriad reasons people buy and sell
property-and transactions in investment securities are certainly
facilitated by negotiability concepts. Perhaps favoritism to any acquirer, including the bona fide purchaser of securities, is intrinsic to
a capitalistic system or, even more generally, to a society which is
restless physically, mentally, and economically. In all events, the law,
as it has evolved, simply recognizes that negotiability inheres in the
structure and technique of the organized securities markets as they
exist today.
Even so, the existing system well protects the true owner when he
most needs it, namely, when his indorsement is forged. Here, he may
usually recover even from a bona fide purchaser16 and, perhaps more
important, he may always recover from the issuer or transfer agent
who registered transfer on the forgery. 17 The latter are usually fiscally
responsible and probably insured, and if they must respond in damages or issue a new security to the aggrieved owner, they also have
rights over against the person, normally a bank or brokerage house,
which guaranteed as genuine the signature which was in fact forged. 1B
12. See generally, U.C.C. § 8-315.
13. See U.C.C. § 8-304(2) for the rule that purchasers need not inquire into the rightfulness of transfer of a security registered in a fiduciary name.
14. See U.C.C. §§ 8-403(1)(2)(a) (stop transfer notice) & 8-405(2) ("lost, destroyed or
wrongfully taken" security).
15. For the view that securities of the same issue are fungible, see U.C.C. § 8-107(1)
and comment 1.
16. ".Bona fide purchaser" is defined in U.C.C. § 8-302, and the right of recovery is
stated in § 8-315(2). However, if the bona fide purchaser has received from the issuer
or transfer agent a new, reissued, or re-registered security in his own name, he is protected even against the true owner. U.C.C. § 8-311(a).
17. U.C.C. § 8-311. Whether or not the true owner may go against the purchaser (see
note 16 supra), he may still recover from the issuer. U.C.C. § 8-404(2).
18. u.c.c. § 8-312.
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Admittedly, absent a forgery, but where delivery is improper for some
other reason, the true owner has no rights against either the bona
fide purchaser,19 or in most cases the issuer or its transfer agent,20
nor does he have rights against a signature guarantor.21 Nevertheless,
it is precisely in this situation that the true owner can most readily
avoid the circumstances which cause or at least contribute to the loss.
Thus, while the true owner lacks the preferences which he would be
afforded under the hypothesized system based on non-negotiability,
the protection he is afforded under the existing system is substantial.
Although these affirmative reasons, standing alone, sufficiently
support full negotiability of securities, it is well to stress the extent
to which a system of non-negotiability would inhibit the operations
of the securities markets, especially where transactions have been, or
are becoming, computerized. If a security is, in fact, non-negotiable
-as is presently the case with some investment media not within the
Code definition22-the purchaser takes it without confidence that he
can ever prevail over the claim of the true owner, as indeed he cannot. It is no answer that he would have rights over against someone,
however financially responsible and well-insured that person might
be. At best, the state of his "title" to the security would be in doubt,
and collection of damages or acquisition of a new security (whose
purity might later be impugned) would be delayed, wholly apart
from the expense of possible litigation over the matter. For the purchaser gains no immunity from adverse claims to a non-negotiable
instrument merely because he does not and could not reasonably be
expected to know of them. The taint would apply equally whether
the purchaser acquired a certificate in the seller's name or one registered into a nominee or even into the purchaser's own name, since
non-negotiability entails the adverse claim's continuing in the new or
reissued certificate. Indeed, far from coexisting with the view that the
certificate subsumes all intangible rights,23 non-negotiability would
19. u.c.c. § 8-315(1).
20. U.C.C. § 8-404(1). Of course, the issuer is still bound to discharge any limited
duty of inquiry it might have under the immediate circumstances of the case (see U.C.C.
§ 8-403), and throughout the transaction it must act in "good faith." U.C.C. § 1-203.
A transfer agent or registrar has the same potential liability to third persons as does
the issuer. U.C.C. § 8-406(1)(b).
21. The true owner has no claim under a signature guarantee since, under U.C.C.
§ 8-312(3), he is not a person "taking or dealing with the security in reliance on the
guarantee ••.." Love v. Pennsylvania R.R., 200 F. Supp. 561 (ED. Pa. 1961); Eulette
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & .Beane, 101 So. 2d 603, 666 (Fla. App. 1958). However, dictum in Love suggests that a true owner would have a claim against a signature
guarantor who had "actual knowledge of the impropriety of the transaction." 200 F.
Supp. at 563. Similar rules would presumably apply to the indorsement guarantee recognized by § 8-312(2).
22. U.C.C. § 8-102(l)(a).
23. That the security itself subsumes and incorporates the intangible rights is well
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demand priority for the true owner's intangible rights and their survival despite the issuance of a new certificate. Clearly, non-negotiability would bring the securities markets to a grinding halt: one cannot
conceive how the markets could handle in a day's time several thousand transactions, let alone the ten million share day which has become increasingly frequent. Furthermore, the computerization of
stock transfers, now adopted in large part by the New York Stock
Exchange and recognized by the Code, would serve little purpose if
effective delivery could not be made by "appropriate entries on the
books of a clearing corporation."24 The use of such facilities, which
are virtually demanded by today's market volume, and their feasibility and economy, are premised on the certificates being the sole repository of the intangible rights to be transferred, on the fungibility
of securities of the same issue, and on the eradication of issuer defenses and adverse claims through the very process of transferring
securities within the organized markets.
Finally, the argument that non-negotiability would compel
greater caution by selling brokers is only superficially persuasive. If
a selling broker has a converter's liability for aiding in a wrongful
transfer of a security, he could protect himself only by a full investigation, not merely of the seller's identity ("know thy customer"), but
of the rightfulness of the seller's proposed transfer as well. One objective of the Code, and of the earlier Uniform Act for the Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers, is to eliminate the bottleneck
under the old law, which resulted from the fact that a transfer agent
could safely register transfer of a security, especially one held by a
fiduciary, only after an often intensive, expensive, and time-consuming investigation. Under a non-negotiability premise, the selling
recognized. E.g., United States v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 244 F. Supp. 19, 24 (W .D.
Mo. 1965); Lesavoy Indus. Inc. v. Pennsylvania Gen. Paper Corp., 404 Pa. 161, 171 A.2d
148 (1961) (Uniform Commercial Code); Mills v. Jacobs, 333 Pa. 231, 4 A.2d 152 (1939)
(Uniform Stock Transfer Act). U.C.C. § 8-317(1) carries this principle to its logical conclusion by making an attachment or levy on a security ineffective unless it is "actually
seized" by the levying or attaching officer.
24. Section 8-320(2) provides for an effective transfer of securities by entries on the
books of the clearing coporation, even though the entries identify no particular securities, but "refer merely to a quantity of a particular security" treated "as a part of a
fungible bulk," and even though entries are made on a "net basis taking into account
other transfers or pledges of the same security.'' As the text indicates, such entries can
operate as a delivery under § 8-313(l)(e). The New York Stock Exchange currently
utilizes a "central certificate" system by which ownership of shares is transferred between members of the NYSE Stock Clearing Corporation's Central Certificate Service
by entries rather than by the pre-existing procedure of physical transfer of securities.
To enable the system to begin operations, members delivered a designated number of
shares to the clearing corporation, which then combined these into very large denomination certificates (worth as much as $10,000,000 each). See Wall Street Journal, June
10, 1965, p. 10, col. 3; id., June 2, 1966, p. 1, col. l; id., Sept. 7, 1966, p. 3, col. 2.
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broker, because of his ultimate liability, would experience the same
compulsion to inquire into the rightfulness of a transfer. Merely to
state this proposition is to demonstrate the difficulty created at the
very threshold of the transaction, for self-protection would force the
broker to investigate each security transfer, not just selected or suspicious trades. Such inquiry, while simple and routine for many
transfers, could become complicated and time-consuming and would
introduce at an earlier stage in securities sales the burdensome
obligations which the old law placed upon transfer agents. This
would unduly inhibit the free fl.ow of securities into the market. Insurance would be no answer, for insurers would pressure brokers to
make the necessary inquiries; and if the risk experience proved bad,
premiums would be high, perhaps prohibitively so, if indeed the insurance industry would accept the risk at all. Signature guarantees
would also not help, since they go only to the genuineness of the signature.25 It would be necessary for prudent brokers to procure indorsement guarantees26 vouching for rightfulness of transfers, and no
prudent indorsement guarantor would act without inquiring, even
if he too had insurance.
Thus, it appears that the amount of protection that a non-negotiable system would provide to true owners is excessive. If it is a good
policy to force selling brokers to use greater care, this should be accomplished, not with the blunt instrument of declaring securities
non-negotiable, but rather with the fine chisel of redefining and
thereby elevating certain specific duties of brokers. Arguably, within
the existing system, some protection for brokers could be withdrawn
by repealing section 8-315, which relieves brokers of liability for
innocent conversion. Alternatively, the SEC, the self-regulatory agencies, or both could stiffen existing rules requiring brokers to scrutinize proposed transactions, without forcing on them a full dress investigation of adverse claims which the Code and the Simplification
Act have rejected for transfer agents.
The negotiability concept, as it has worked itself out in the context of investment securities, is justifiable apart from arguments
as to the desirability of destroying or basically altering the established
nexus of customs, market practices, and legal rules. Sacrificing the
extra margin of protection for true owners obtainable from a different set of premises does not seem to be an undue cost for the advantages to purchasers, and ultimately to sellers, which a market
25. See U.C.C. § 8-312(1), whose postamble states that "the [signature] guarantor
does not otherwise warrant the rightfulness of the particular transfer."
26. u.c.c. § 8-312(2).
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grounded upon negotiability provides for everyone. Given the existing measure of protection for true owners, the balance of convenience
seems properly struck and thus the underlying premise of Article
Eight is, in my view, fully justified.27
II.

INADEQUACIBS OF THE DEFINITION OF "SECURITY"

The ambit of Article Eight's coverage is fixed by its definition of
"security.''28 Thus, the benefit of the Code rules, the liabilities and
duties the Code imposes, and the corresponding clarity and certainty
of this area of the law extend no further than this definition. 29 Differing markedly from the expansive meaning of "security" in federal
and state securities statutes,30 whose purpose is to encompass every
means of defrauding investors, the object of the Code definition is
to make negotiable only those instruments currently accepted in the
markets as established investment media. In brief, a security under
the Code is an "instrument"31 meeting four conditions: (I) it is in
bearer or registered form; 32 (2) it is one of (or divisible into) a class
or series of instruments (as distinguished from being a unique instrument) ;33 (3) it evidences either an issuer's obligation, a share, a par27. It is apparent that courts construing Article Eight will draw on the Article
Three rules which relate to commercial paper in order to supplement the former. For
a recent and conspicuous instance, see E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Manufacturer's Nat'! Bank,
259 F. Supp. 513 (E.D. Mich. 1966), in which the court draws an analogy to the rule
that one who discharges his own commercial paper does not become a holder in due
course in the process and holds that an issuer reacquiring its own securities for cancellation (warrants, in this case) is neither a bona fide purchaser nor even a purchaser of
the securities. Id. at 518. However, there is a delicate line which must be observed since
both § 3-103(1) and § 8-102(l)(b) pretty clearly prevent the direct application of Article
Three to investment securities. But this should be read as meaning only that Article
Eight's provisions always govern securities-not as precluding recourse to Article Three
for pertinent analogies on points not specifically covered by Article Eight and not inconsistent with the latter's purposes. On the contrary, this certainly is appropriate if
only because both negotiable commercial and investment paper developed out of a
common matrix of law merchant and common law and have more similarities than
differences.
28. U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(a).
29. If a "writing" is a "security" within the definition, then it is governed by Article
Eight and not by Article Three (Commercial Paper). U.C.C. § 8-102(l)(b). If the instrument is neither an Article Eight security nor Article Three commercial paper, it falls
outside the Code. Presumably, in this event, rules could be formulated by analogy to
Code concepts drawn from both articles and applied to such an instrument. However,
the Code furnishes no guidance to analogical use of its rules for long-term investment
instruments not covered by the definition of "security." In contrast is § 3-805 making
certain Article Three rules applicable to commercial paper "otherwise negotiable •••
but which is not payable to order or to bearer."
30. E.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1964); UNIFORM
SECURITIES Acr § 401.
31. "Instrument" is an undefined term in the Code.
32. U.C.C. §§ 8-102(l)(a)(i), 8-102(l)(c) 8: (d).
33. U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(a)(iii).
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ticipation, or some other interest in property or in an enterprise; 34
and (4) it "is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges
or markets or commonly recognized . . . as a medium for investment."35 Since the overall purpose of Article Eight is to make investment securities fully negotiable, rather than to bar the issue and sale
of fraudulent investments, the Code definition favors not the unique
and unusual instrument, but instead the relatively familiar security
with which the organized markets feel comfortable as a result of custom and usage.36 Significantly, the Code definition does not contain
substantive restrictions such as the NIL applied to bonds and debentures,37 but employs formal and functional criteria. It is not the purpose of this article to elaborate on these definitional conditions.38 In
general, however, the term "security" as used in the Code covers virtually all currently recognized investment securities. Without distinction at the definitional level, it includes both equity interests (such
as shares of stock, voting trust certificates, stock options, warrants and
scrip, mutual fund shares, and American Depositary Receipts) and
creditor interests (such as bonds, debentures, and subordinated interests), as well as, presumably, many "hybrid" interests which teeter
on the thin edge between creditor and equity securities. Included
also are state and municipal securities, interests in and obligations
of non-corporate entities such as limited partnerships and business
trusts, fractional interests in oil and gas, and others. The term "security" does not, however, seem to embrace commodity investment contracts. 39
Despite its breadth, the definition is, in my view, defective in two
respects. First, although adequate in terms of existing markets, it is
too rigid to permit "new" forms of investment securities readily to
acquire negotiability through the traditional avenue of custom, that
34. U.C.C. § 8-102(l)(a)(iv).
35. U.C.C. § 8-102(l)(a)(ii).
36. As Carlos Israels has expressed it, "uniqueness of form must logically militate
against inclusion in the category [of securities, since] commercial justification for negotiability requires not uniqueness but familiarity." Israels, Investment Securities as Negotiable Paper-Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 13 Bus. LAw 676, 678 (1958).
37. E.g., the requirement in N.I.L. § I that the instrument carry an unconditional
promise to pay a sum certain in money.
38. For a full analysis of the details of each part of the definition, see Folk, Article
8: Investment Securities, 44 N.C.L. REv. 654, 655-62 (1966).
39. Several factors point to this result. A security must be of a type traded "upon
securities exchanges or markets" (U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(a)(ii)), and commodity investment
contracts are not traded on securities exchanges or markets. Moreover, commodity contracts are not generally thought of as a "medium for investment" in the same sense as
are listed or unlisted stocks or bonds. See also Sinva Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
&: Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), which held that commodity contracts are
not "investment contracts" and therefore not a "security" under the federal securities
acts.
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is, by gradual acceptance in the money markets. Second, the definition does not, as I think it should, recognize negotiability by contract.
A. Repressing Negotiability by Custom
It can generally be said, both as to commercial and investment
paper, that, for the most part, instruments have come to be recognized as negotiable through the gradual accretion of customs which
eventually have been accepted by the courts as binding or, if (as in
some instances) rejected by the courts, have later been validated by
statute. Of course, there is an element of chance in the court's acceptance of custom; the decision may depend even more than in other
contexts upon the ability of counsel, the intelligence and responsiveness of the sitting judge, the character of the transaction, the factual
context in which the negotiability issue is posed, the inherent equities of the situation, and other accidental factors. Yet, untrammeled
by statutory definitions and aided by judicial receptiveness to custom,
novel and developing investment securities gradually acquired negotiable status. This is especially evident in an impressive line of 19th
century English decisions. In succession, the courts held the following to be negotiable: non-English government bonds actively traded
in England; 40 scrip entitling the holder to definitive bonds of the issuer;41 scrip entitling the bearer to become a registered shareholder
in an English corporation; 42 and finally English48 and non-English44
corporate debentures. Possibilities of further development in England are not prevented by relevant statutory definitions of investment
security, since the English Bills of Exchange Act does not deal with
investment creditor securities.45 The grossest example of a statute
stifling the evolution of a recognized custom of negotiability for investment securities is the NIL's inclusion of bonds and debentures
within its overly broad coverage, which resulted in the premature,
and not very good, codification of an area of law still in the formative
stage.
Two classic decisions, which are not dramatically different on
40. Heseltine v. Siggers, 1 Exch. 856, 154 Eng. Rep. 365 (Ex. 1848); Attorney General v• .Bouwens, 4 M. &: W. 171, 150 Eng. Rep. 1390 (Ex. 1838); Gorgier v. Mileville,
3 B. &: C. 45, 107 Eng. Rep. 651 (K.B. 1824).
41. Goodwin v. Robarts, [1875] L.R. 10 Ex. 337, aff'd [1876] 1 A.C. 476.
42. Rumball v. Metropolitan Bank, [1877] LR. 2 Q.B. 194.
43. Edelstein v. Schuler &: Co., [1902] 2 K.B. 144; Bechuanaland Exploration Co. v.
London Trading .Bank, Ltd., [1898] 2 Q.B. 658.
44. London Joint Stock Bank v. Simmons, [1892] 17 A.C. 201. See also Bentinck v.
London Joint Stock Bank, [1893] 2 Ch. 120.
45. Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 &: 46 Viet. 292, c. 61.
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their facts, highlight the issue. In Goodwin v. Robarts,46 two English
courts sustained the negotiability of underwriters' scrip for definitive
bonds to be issued subsequently by the Russian government. A
broker who held plaintiff's scrip wrongfully pledged it to secure a
loan from defendants, who were bona fide purchasers without notice
of plaintiff's interest. By all traditional doctrines of commercial
paper, the scrip was non-negotiable because of the following facts:
(I) it was payable not in money but in definitive bonds; (2) the underwriters obligated themselves only to transmit definitive bonds
when they were received; (3) although the scrip was in form the obligation of the underwriters, it was viewed by the court as a direct
obligation of the issuer; and (4) traditional promissory words were
lacking, although the scrip stated that "the bearer will be entitled to
receive a definitive bond or bonds." 47 In sustaining the pledgee's
rights over those of the original owner, the court rested negotiability
upon a finding of a more-than-fifty year custom by which scrip for
foreign government obligations had passed solely by delivery. Repudiating any concept of the law merchant as "fixed and stereotyped
and incapable of being expanded and enlarged,"48 the court broadly
affirmed the continuing vitality of the "process" by which "what before was usage only, unsanctioned by legal decision, has become engrafted upon, or incorporated into, the common law," and stressed
the policy objectives of facilitating the ready transfer of securities
rather than "requiring some more cumbrous method of assignment"
that would "materially hamper the transactions of the money market
. . . and cause great public inconvenience."49
Manhattan Co. v. Morgan 50 involved similar scrip. Here, the
New York Court of Appeals held the instruments non-negotiable
under the NIL; thus voiding plaintiff's claim as a bona-fide purchaser of instruments stolen from the true owner and later transferred to plaintiff. The thrust of the decision is the impossibility
of holding that the scrip could be negotiable, in the teeth of the
NIL's express prohibition. 51 Even assuming that, absent statute, the
English view would prevail and that a sufficient custom existed in
the New York investment community,52 neither precedent nor
custom could override positive law requirements. The New York
legislature quickly corrected the result in this case by passing the not
46.
47.
48.
49.
!i0.
51.
52.

[1875] L.R. 10 Ex. 337, afj'd [1876] I A.C. 476.
The text of the instrument appears at [1875] L.R. 10 Ex. 339.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 353.
242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926).
Id. at 48, 150 N.E. at 597.
Id. at 53, 150 N.E. at 599.
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wholly satisfactory Hofstadter Act,53 which has since been superseded in that state by the Code. Such corrective measures, of course,
in no way impair the principle of the Manhattan case that custom
cannot lawfully controvert a statutory requirement.
This principle remains equally applicable under Article Eight's
definition of securities which, I suggest, may serve to suppress the
development through custom of the negotiability of new investment
securities. The critical Code requirement is that a security be "of a
type commonly dealt in upon" securities markets or "commonly recognized . . . as a medium for investment." This very language poses
a dilemma. A new kind of investment paper-one which has just
come into being or has been resurrected in response to some felt need
-by hypothesis cannot be a "security" until it has come to be "commonly dealt in upon" markets or recognized as a proper "medium for
investment." Yet such investment paper is not likely to meet these
requirements if it cannot in the first instance meet the Code definition of "security," and thus be assured of negotiability. To criticize
the Code's definition, one need not assert that new investment paper
can never achieve the required recognition and acceptance; like the
salmon, it may succeed in swimming upstream. Nevertheless, if the
Code definition is likely to retard the recognition of new securities,
and in particular to chill the climate in which the tender plant of
incipient custom must grow, then the definition requires criticism
and correction. At best, recognition as a negotiable security is needlessly uncertain if such an explicit Code condition virtually confines
negotiable securities to those recognized at the time of enactment.
For this reason, smart money is not apt to take the risk, other things
being equal, of an instrument of uncertain character. As an example,
suppose that at some early date American Depositary Receipts have
just been introduced and that in all respects the receipts comply with
the Code provisions, except that their hypothesized novelty means
that they have not been traded in the securities markets or recognized
as investment media. If the Code definition were in effect at that
time, it is hard to see how American Depositary Receipts could have
been securities when introduced, and the likely impairment of their
sale and transfer would retard any growth in the custom which might
later be translated into law.
Another illustration is the order bond. Assume a twenty-year written obligation for one million dollars issued by Corporation A and
privately placed with Insurance Company B. It is made payable to
B's order but is not registerable. Clearly, it is not a "security" since
53. N.Y.

PERS. PROP.

LAw § 260 (McKinney 1962).
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it is in neither registered nor bearer form. 54 Its negotiability will depend on its conformity with Article Three-Commercial Paper. If
under the instrument the promise is conditional, it will not comply
with Article Three and thus not be negotiable.55 The same would
be true if an issuer decided to market, rather than privately place, a
class of order debentures or bonds. Not only does there appear to be
no reason for excluding the order instrument from the definition of
"security," but, further, the restrictiveness of that definition seems
compounded by the fact that, so far as is known, the order debenture
or bond is probably not "of a type commonly dealt in upon securities
exchanges or markets" or "commonly recognized . . . as a medium
for investment." Thus, should order bonds or debentures ever become, for reasons not apparent to us at this moment, an attractive
means of raising long-term money, they would have to overcome the
barrier of the Code definition.
None of this is to argue that codification of the law of investment
securities is improper. Indeed, the law of investment securities has
reached a stage of maturity where codification is appropriate. The
values of certainty and clarity which are furthered by a good codification-and on a whole Article Eight is that-may sometimes outweigh the inhibitions imposed by statutory language upon judicial
innovation. However, this is not true when the restrictive definition
is of the most central term-"security"-in the codified law. For a
restriction at this point virtually closes off the area of development,
and makes of the Code provisions a set of house rules for an already
established category of securities.
Nevertheless, the definition may not, in the long run, prove so
restrictive in operation. Thus, legislatures, in response to the needs
of the investment community, may enlarge the category of negotiable
securities. _However, such legislation is usually a reaction, often to a
decision striking down negotiability, and thus is likely to be delayed.
In the meanwhile, a needless degree of uncertainty will persist. Although there is inescapably some uncertainty while new instruments
are evolving through mercantile custom toward legally cognizable
negotiability, this differs from the much deeper doubt as to whether
a particular kind of new instrument, however often traded, can ever
be held to be negotiable. It is this latter mode of uncertainty which
the Code definition needlessly creates; the other type can be, indeed
should be, tolerated so that novel instruments can be put to the proof
of the market.
54. U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(a)(i).
55. U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(b) requires "an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum
certain in money" for a writing to be "a negotiable instrument within this Article, •••"
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In addition, an area for interstitial development of custom may
exist under the Code definition. The definition does not demand that
instruments be commonly recognized as "negotiable securities" in the
strict sense of instruments whose transfer to bona-fide purchasers extinguishes adverse claims and issuer defenses. Rather, they need only
be "dealt in" on exchanges or otherwise recognized as a "medium
for investment." This is a broader concept than "security," as defined,
since an instrument may be a recognized investment medium but not
a "security" for failure to comply with the other conditions of the
definition. Although not explicit on this point, certain language in
Goodwin v. Robarts56 seemingly requires only proof of a mercantile
custom of common acceptance and ready transfer, rather than of a
conscious recognition by financiers and investors that the legal consequences of negotiability-extinguishing defenses and claims-will
necessarily occur. If this approach can be carried over into the Code,
then the definition of "security" may possibly leave an opening, however narrow, so that new forms of investments can mature (that is,
come to comply with the other conditions of the definition of "security") into recognized securities. However, this subtlety is so refined,
so evanescent, that it is at least doubtful that an instrument not already traded or recognized will be able to achieve the necessary measure of acceptance in the markets.

B. Refusing To Recognize Negotiability by Contract
Some years ago, a topic commanding interest was the possibility
of making commercial paper negotiable "by contract." Probably no
consensus was reached on this point in view of the rigidity of the
NIL definitions and the weight of the Manhattan 57 decision, although
one scholar concluded that a carefully worded clause which purports
to make an instrument negotiable would be sustained. 58 There was
little explicit discussion of the question in the context of investment
securities, although many investment securities would have benefited
from a clearly articulated principle favoring negotiability by contract
terms. For instance, such a principle might have aided the development of the registered bond which was always shadowed by the fact
that its registration provisions were, verbally at least, at variance with
the doctrine of free and full transferability of negotiable paper.59
56. [1875] L.R. 10 Ex. 337, affd (1876] 1 A.C. 476.
57. Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926).
58. Beutel, Negotiability by Contract: A Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 28
ILL. L. REv. 205 (1933).
59. For a valuable discussion, although long antedating the Code, see Steffen & Russell, Registered Bonds and Negotiability, 47 HARv. L. REv. 741 (1934).
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Similar benefits would have accrued to other instruments, whose
negotiability under separate statutes such as the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act and the NIL, was not specifically recognized. Such instruments include interim receipts (of the Manhattan-case type),
equipment trust instruments, voting trust certificates, and others.
It has been contended that the decision in Enoch v. Brandon60
did recognize negotiability by contract in the context of investment
securities, 61 although this reading of the case has not been generally
accepted. In that case the New York Court of Appeals was confronted
with the question of the negotiability of a bond which was explicitly
made "subject" to the provisions of the mortgage indenture under
which it was. secured. The word "subject" appeared to make the
bond's promise conditional.62 However, the court construed this
language as referring only to the security backing the promise to pay,
and not as impairing the unconditional character of the bond's
promise itself. Thus, the court's skilfully devised formula sustained
the negotiability of bonds and debentures which, by the established
practice of the investment community, employ elaborate and detailed
indentures that set forth the particulars concerning the issue of securities. Obviously, policy considerations dictated this desirable result
which was not readily justified by the literal language of the statute
or the instrument. The bond in Enoch v. Brandon also contained a
clause which provided that the bonds "are to be treated as negotiable
and all persons are invited by the [issuer] to act accordingly" 63 and
thus the possible alternative ground of "negotiability by contract"
was suggested. However, this language at most seems to exhibit the
parties' intention to make the instrument negotiable, and thus could
be used as a counterweight to other clauses which possibly cast doubt
on its negotiability. Certainly, the narrower and more defensible
reading of the decision is the judicial formula which treats the "subject to" clause as stipulating rights to the security, rather than as conditioning the promise to pay.
It is now an academic question whether Enoch v. Brandon did
endorse negotiability by contract, since indenture bonds are clearly
negotiable under the Code. However, it is not an academic question
whether negotiability by contract is congruent with the Code and
whether as a matter of policy such freedom should be recognized by
basic commercial law throughout the country.
60.
61.
62.
63.

249 N.Y. 263, 164 N.E. 45 (1928).
.Beutel, supra note 58, at 221.
249 N.Y. 263, 266, 164 N.E. 45, 46 (1928).

Ibid.
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I. Policy Considerations in Favor of Making Investment
Securities Negotiable by Contract
The explicit acceptance and recognition that investment securities may be made negotiable by contract seems a logical outcome of
the long-run trend toward full negotiability of securities. Assuming
that there are possible dangers in making commercial paper negotiable by contract, it seems that many of these risks would not be present
in the sphere of investment paper. By and large investment securities
are handled by more sophisticated persons, if only because more
people have occasion to execute or indorse notes and checks than to
buy and sell investment paper. Moreover, the public policy of promoting the free transfer of investment paper is furthered by permitting the express acceptance of contract terms which have the effect
of creating negotiability. In particular, under the Code definition of
"security," 64 negotiability clauses would make it easier for a "new"
security to surmount the hurdle of the Code requirement of prior
general acceptance as an investment medium. In short, the definition
of "security" should provide that if an instrument meets all of the
statutory conditions except for general acceptance as an investment
medium, it is still a security if it contains terms which clearly declare
that it is a negotiable instrument which is governed by the rules of
Article Eight of the Uniform Commercial Code.
However, since such a clause is potentially dangerous, there
should be safeguards against abuses. The instrument should note
conspicuously that it is a "negotiable investment security." 65 In addition, the body of the instrument should spell out with clarity,
though not necessarily with detail, that purchasers for value and
without notice will enjoy immunity from issuer defenses, 66 while
bona fide purchasers will acquire the security free from adverse
claims as well. 67 However, too much detail is undesirable since it
64. U.C.C. § 8-I02(l)(a).
65. "Note conspicuously" is used as a term of art in the Code. For example, transfer
restrictions must be "noted conspicuously" to be effective. U.C.C. § 8-204. "Conspicuous"
is defined in § 1-201(10).
66. This phrase characterizes the transferee who may successfully resist an issuer's
defenses on an investment security (see U.C.C. § 8-202(1), (3) & (4)), and it is to be distinguished from a "bona fide purchaser" (see U.C.C. § 8-302 which is discussed in note
67 infra), and from a "purchaser for value and without notice of adverse claims who
has in good faith received a new, reissued or re-registered security on registration of
transfer." U.C.C. § 8-3ll(a).
67. Under U.C.C. § 8-301(2), one who qualifies as a "bona fide purchaser" may extinguish adverse claims. In addition, if a "bona fide purchaser" acquires the security
by a formally perfect transfer (viz., by delivery of a bearer-form instrument, or by issue
or indorsement of a registered-form security), then, by virtue of U.C.C. § 8-302, he qualifies as a purchaser for value in good faith and without notice of any adverse claim.
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might conflict with the specific legal consequences that are spelled
out by Article Eight. Yet the wording should be specific enough so
that all persons who acquire the instrument can fairly be said to have
intended that the instrument be treated as negotiable. 68 Since all
trading in the investment community assumes the negotiability of
investment securities, it seems that, as to "new" forms of securities,
such negotiability by contract would accord with common experience
and belief.
Although it should be apparent, it is worth stressing that negotiability by contract would neither impair enforcement of any fiduciary duty under corporate law nor affect liabilities under securities
statutes. So far as the issuer is concerned, negotiability by contract,
like the clauses of Article Eight means only that issuer defenses are
extinguished in the hands of purchasers for value and without notice
-not that liabilities of an issuer or its management are limited.
Moreover, any supposition that negotiability by contract would
promote trading in unsound securities is unfounded. The issuer, in
the unlikely event that it issues securities which it knows or thinks
will create defenses, will not be likely to choose language which
would eliminate such defenses. Furthermore, leaving aside some
forms of securities which are peddled on the disreputable fringes of
the investment business, the rather sober and calculating gray eminences of the investment world are unlikely to insert the language of
negotiability into a new instrument unless they have affirmative business reasons for desiring negotiability and have doubts as to whether
the instrument has that quality under existing law. As for the disreputable elements, it is doubtful that Ben-Jack Cage or others of
that ilk would envision or perpetrate even more spectacular frauds
--or that those who dream up investment contracts will create
weirder forms of deceiving the public-simply because they are
68. This position involves a tricky problem. It assumes that the explicit statement
of negotiability is known to and accepted by the purchaser, who thus manifests his
intent to treat the instrument as negotiable. :But under standard transfer procedures,
the purchaser may see his certificate only after the transaction (or not at all, if his
broker keeps it) and so, realistically, he lacks notice. One approach would be to let him
rescind the transaction upon discovering that his security is negotiable by contract. But
this is overgenerous and would give him an undeserved means of recapturing paper
losses. More reasonably, he could be deemed to take the security with notice and be
bound by its negotiability clause if he does not object within a reasonable (perhaps a
specified) time after he or his broker acquires the security. This is better, but arguably
still too generous to investors who probably assume negotiability (if they ever think of
it) and who are no more likely to be harmed by a security negotiable by contract than
by one negotiable under the Code definition. Perhaps more to the point would be a
right of rescission if the security varied in some material respect from what it was authoritatively represented to be.
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credibly informed that what they choose to call a "security" may be
made negotiable by contract terms.

2. Does the Code Permit Negotiability by Contract for
Investment Securities?
The concept of pure negotiability by contract seems inconsistent
with Article Eight's definition of "security," 69 since it could result in
an instrument being negotiable even though not "of a type commonly
dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or commonly recognized . . . as a medium for investment." 70 The relevant question,
then, is whether Article One's general provisions, which are applicable to the entire Code, permit the results which negotiability by contract would create. Admittedly, it is doubtful that these general provisions accomplish this purpose or are even intended to do so, but if
they do, the Code is undesirably unclear and round-about in authorizing this result.
Under section 1-102(3), any Code rule "may be varied by agreement" unless otherwise provided by the Code, "except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed
by [the Code] may not be disclaimed by agreement . . . ." Clearly,
enlarging the definition of "security" does not itself violate the latter
clause. Assuming that Article Eight's definition section is a "provision of this Act," it follows that the definition could be expanded.
Yet it is by no means clear that so literal a reading is intended by
section 1-102(3). Instead, "provision of this Act" may not refer to the
basic definition sections but only to those sections that state legal
consequences. The relevant Code comments, which use commercial
paper illustrations, seemingly negate any enlargement of basic definitions. While piously disclaiming "the type of interference with evolutionary growth found in" the Manhattan case, the Code comments
observe that "private parties cannot make an instrument negotiable
within the meaning of Article 3 (Commercial Paper) except as provided in" the relevant definition section of Article Three.71 Precisely
the same comment could be made about the definition section of
Article Eight. Thus, we have an instance of a comment, while not
flatly contradicting Code language, at least limiting needlessly vague
legislative terminology.
Nevertheless, the Code comment does seem inconsistent with the
declared policy of the Code that it "shall be liberally construed and
69. U.C.C. § 8-102(l)(a).
70. U.C.C. § 8-102(I)(a)(ii).
71. U.C.C. § 1-102, comment 2. See also note 50 supra.
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applied .
to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties . . . ." 72
Yet, arguably, even this high-sounding "underlying purpose and
policy" must be implemented within the defined coverage of the
Code, so that "agreement of the parties" cannot enlarge the sweep of
Article Eight beyond the definition of "security" any more than an
agreement among the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction
upon a court.
The fact is that, if negotiability by contract is appropriate for investment securities, it should be expressly authorized. Based on the
language of the Code, we can only assume that the status of negotiability by contract is sufficiently ambiguous so as to make it, at best, an
unreliable tool. Indeed, the Code language is probably inconsistent
with such broad contractual freedom. The very comprehensiveness
of the Code-and, more specifically, the admittedly broad scope of
the definition of "security"-makes it appear pre-emptive of any
efforts to go beyond the stated limits by contract provisions. Yet even
if the Code's language in Article One can be read as giving a faint
"go signal" for cautious moves toward instruments negotiable by
contract, such an approach may be hypersubtle and at best confusing.
It is suggested, accordingly, that Article Eight expressly recognize
negotiability by contract with certain safeguards as suggested above.
One simple solution would be to reword the crucial clause of section
8-102(l)(a) as follows:
A "security" is an instrument which
(ii) is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or commonly recognized in any area in which it is issued or
dealt in as a medium for investment, or by its explicitly stated
terms conspicuously noted on the instrument is to be governed
by this Article. .. .1a

Ill.

THE CODE AND TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS

It is curious that, as full negotiability becomes the norm for
investment securities, there has arisen concurrently the need to
restrict the transfer and the registrat~on of transfer74 of investment
72. U.C.C. § 1-102(1) & (2). (Emphasis added.)
73. New matter is in italics.
74. In the Code, the undefined term "transfer" and its derivatives refer to the passage of a security or interest therein from one person to another; it roughly corresponds
to, although it is broader than, the term "assign" which is customarily used in the
securities industry and in some statutes. E.g., UNIFORM Acr FOR SIMPLIFICATION
OF FIDUCIARY SECURITY TRANSFERS § l(a). "Registration of transfer" refers to the change
of record ownership of a registered-form security by the act of the issuer or transfer
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securities. In part, this reflects the increasing divergence between
close and public corporations; the conventional view being that
it is often desirable to limit or (if legally possible) preclude the
transfer of equity interests in close corporations, while facilitating
the trading in like interests in publicly held corporations. However,
this is not the whole story, since even publicly held corporations
routinely use certain transfer restrictions in financing through a
sale of securities.
Transfer restrictions are not, in fact, a reaction against the enlarged negotiability of investment securities. Indeed, were the Code
to declare that securities are not negotiable instruments, transfer
restrictions would still be indispensable, since they are directed to
objectives other than preventing bona fide purchasers from extinguishing issuer defenses and adverse claims. For small enterprises, transfer restrictions are designed to keep the equity interests
from falling under hostile control or from going outside the limited
group of original shareholders, or, at least, to limit the extent to
which these undesired consequences may occur. Close corporations
commonly employ the following types of transfer restrictions: first
option arrangements, by which the corporation or one or more of
the shareholders or some combination of these interests have an
option to acquire the restricted shares; buy-and-sell arrangements,
by which the restricted shares are subject to contractual obligations
between shareholders and either the corporation or other shareholders or both; and consent restrictions, by which directors or shareholders must agree to an outside sale of shares.75 Other more stringent
restrictions are possible, but these are of doubtful validity.76 For the
publicly-owned corporation, the restrictions are usually desired to
preserve the exempt status under securities regulations laws of
transactions by which securities are "privately placed" with a
limited number of "sophisticated," often institutional, investors77
or are sold exclusively within the state in which the enterprise is
incorporated and does its principal business.78 Here the restrictions
agent; confusingly enough, its counterpart term in other statutes is "transfer," e.g.,
SIMPLIFICATION Acr § l(g).
75. First option and buy-and-sell arrangements are usually upheld by the courts.
See O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§ 7.09 8e 7.10 (1958). The validity of consent restrictions is more difficult to predict, and even those jurisdictions which have sustained
them usually impose rather strict requirements of reasonableness on their use.
76. These would include restrictions which bar any transfer of the restricted
security, or confine transfer to designated transferees (or classes of transferees), or
forbid transfer to all but designated persons or classes. See O'NEAL, op. cit. supra note
75, § 7.08 (1958).
77. Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 48 Stat. 77, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1964).
78, Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(ll), 48 Stat. 906, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1964).
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may take the form of a "stop transfer" notice, which will block or
defer registration of transfer until the corporation is satisfied that
transfer will not impair the exempt status of the transaction under
which the securities were originally issued.
The Code neither enlarges nor limits the substantive validity
of transfer restrictions, but does impose certain form and notice
requirements.,. 9 Substantive validity is determined by corporate law,
which, generally speaking, has looked askance at transfer restrictions both by strictly construing those forms which have been upheld
and by striking down others-usually invoking policies rooted in
property law which are opposed to restraints on alienation. Thus,
the Code section operates only upon "otherwise lawful" restrictions.
In a hypothetical jurisdiction outlawing all transfer restrictions, 80
the Code provision would have no role to perform. However, in an
equally hypothetical jurisdiction sustaining every type of transfer
restriction, the formal requirements of the Code would limit the
effect of these restrictions.

A. "Noted Conspicuously" and "Actual Knowledge"
The Code denies legal effect to transfer restrictions which are
not "noted conspicuously" on the security, that is, which are not
"so ·written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate
ought to have noticed it." 81 This approach works quite effectively.
Assuming that the original certificate with a conspicuously-noted
restriction has been indorsed and delivered to the transferee, he can
return it to his transferor and demand a "clean" certificate which
is free of any such restriction. Moreover, the receipt of the certificate
gives the transferee notice of an "adverse claim,"82 namely, the
issuer's claim that the transfer of the security is subject to certain
controls, such as a first option or consent arrangement, or a stop
transfer notice. If the transferee sends such a restricted certificate
to be registered into his name-that is, to obtain record ownership-he cannot compel the corporation or its transfer agent to
register transfer of the security. In this case, the restricted certificate
would be returned to the transferee. The result, then, is that the
79. u.c.c. § 8-204.
80. New Hampshire comes close to such a hypothetical jurisdiction in that its
law bars any corporate by-law that restricts the sale of shares. N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN.
§ 296:14 (1966).
81. u.c.c. § 1-201(10).
82. " 'Adverse claim' includes a claim that a transfer was or would be wrongful ••••"
U.C.C. § 8-301(1). A transfer restriction is deemed to be an "adverse claim.'' U.C.C.
§ 8·204, comment 1.
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transferee could lawfully rescind the transaction or require the
transferor to purchase shares on the market (possibly at a higher
price) in order to furnish a clean certificate. In part this redress
is based on the transferor's breach of his implied warranty that the
transferee can obtain registration of transfer into his name.83 Of
course, there are limits inherent in rescission and related remedies:
the transferor may be insolvent or absent from the jurisdiction or
it may be impossible to obtain a clean certificate. However, the
theory is that the issuer's concern to preserve its interests transcends
the purchaser's desire to consummate the transaction at no loss
to himself.
Usually, the purchaser does not receive the original indorsed
certificate (whether restricted or not). At least on the organized
markets, it is nearly universal practice for the seller's broker to
register the securities out of the seller's name and into a name which
is acceptable for ready transfer in the securities markets.84 The
result is that even if a broker was willing to handle a restricted
certificate-an unlikely situation-the transaction still would not
proceed, since the issuer or its transfer agent would refuse to register
transfer out of the seller's name and into a name acceptable for
market transactions. Thus, in practice, the sale of the security would
be thwarted at the threshold. The restricted certificate would go
back to the broker-dealer and thence to the seller. The latter would
have to forget the sale, comply with the restriction, or seek to have
the restriction invalidated.
A restriction which is not "noted conspicuously" is effective
only against those who have "actual knowledge" of its existence.85
At first glance, this seems, if not inconsistent with, at least inappropriate for, a commercial law system which avowedly subsumes
the security-holder's intangible rights into a piece of negotiable
paper to facilitate full and free transferability of the security.86 Indeed, it would seem more congruent with these objectives for the
83. See U.C.C. §§ 8-306(2) (warranties of the transferor that the transfer is
"effective and rightful'? & 8-316 (the transferor's obligation to assist the purchaser
in obtaining registration of transfer).
84. See U.C.C. § 8-314(1) defining the point at which the selling customer and the
selling broker fulfill their respective delivery obligations.
85. u.c.c. § 8-204.
86. U.C.C. § 8-317 takes the logical step of providing that a security cannot be
effectively attached or levied on unless and until "actually seized" by the attaching
official. The UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT §§ 13 & 14 had permitted attachment or
levy by injunction, but since the enjoined owner still had the power to transfer the
certificate to a bona fide purchaser, this attachment by injunction could be thwarted.
Thus, the Code rule obviously goes farther than earlier uniform statutes in making
the "security," in effect, the piece of paper.
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transfer restriction to be effective only if duly noted on the paper
itself. True, it would be strong medicine to allow a transferee to
disregard a restriction of which he knew, to the detriment of those
who desired and needed the restriction. Yet it is their misfortune
or a result of their incompetence that they did not comply with
the formal means of giving notice through a recital in the certificate.
Undoubtedly, the "actual knowledge" provision of the Code
poses real difficulties. It is hard to pin down the contours of a concept which, in its application, has a disturbing tendency to waver
back and forth between referring to information which was consciously present to one's mind and to information which the person
ought to have had present. Problems of proof are not easy. The
concept seems out of place in the otherwise fairly objective system
of law embodied in Article Eight.
An illustration87 suggests some of the difficulties of fitting the
"actual knowledge" concept into the Code structure. A prospective
purchaser of shares is told that the corporate by-laws contain a
transfer restriction which is not noted on the certificate which is to
be indorsed to him. Although the by-laws in fact contain such a
restriction (and we assume it to be valid under corporate law), the
purchaser is subsequently assured by responsible corporate personnel
that there is no such restriction. Later, the purchaser closes the
deal only to have the transfer agent either refuse to register transfer
or insist upon continuing the restriction against him. We may
assume that it is more profitable to hold the shares than to rescind,
or that the seller is unable to perform if the purchaser elects rescission. The question, then, is whether the purchaser had "actual
knowledge" of the restriction, which would be as binding on him
as if the restriction had been "noted conspicuously" on the security.
If he did, the purchaser loses; if not, he is entitled to registration
of transfer and issuance of a clean certificate. In fact, the transferee
probably would prevail in this situation, although it is not easy
to work out his rights under Article Eight because of the complications created by the "actual knowledge" exception. Absent the
assurances of no transfer restriction, the purchaser clearly had
"actual knowledge" of an unnoted restriction. However, the assurances given him significantly change the picture. "The principles
of law and equity, including ... the law relative to ... principal
and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation ... shall supplement"
the Code provisions "unless displaced by the particular provisions
87. I owe this provocative example to Professor Alfred F. Conard of the University
of Michigan Law School.
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of" the Code.88 No relevant Code provision displaces normal agency
rules in this situation, unless it can be said that "actual knowledge,"
once it has been acquired, can never be extinguished in its legal
effect by denials or representations which happen to be false. However, the manifest injustice of giving such overriding effect to
"actual knowledge" should require in this situation that the officer
who disclaimed the transfer restriction be held to have bound the corporation in so representing, or that he be viewed as having had apparent authority to waive the restriction. Hence, the purchaser, misled
as he was by the representations (or waiver) should be entitled to
registration of transfer. Of course, registration could be delayed by
the issuer or transfer agent. Under the Code, the obligation to
register transfer is conditioned, inter alia, on two requirements:
that the issuer either has no duty or has discharged its duty to
investigate adverse claims (including unnoted transfer restrictions),
and that the transfer is to a bona fide purchaser.89 Although bona
fide purchaser status depends on having no "notice of any adverse
claim," it has been argued that in this situation there has been no
such "notice," or at least that the apparent notice is legally ineffective. As for the duty to register transfer, assuming that the transfer
agent's investigation discloses the situation that has just been described, the basic question again arises: whether the purchaser had
"actual knowledge" of the restriction. 90
To be fair and workable, the "actual knowledge" concept must
be limited by legal concepts outside of the Code. Only in this way
can we strike a fair balance between the interests of the misled
purchaser and those of the corporation invoking an unnoted restriction. Othenvise stated, an unnoted restriction should be narrowly
construed. Indeed, the very theory of the restriction that is not
noted but is "actually known" to the purchaser-that he cannot
justly be permitted knowingly to obliterate the rights of othersdemands a similar limitation upon an issuer-that it cannot fairly
disclaim the apparently authorized acts of its agents to the detriment
of purchasers who have relied on those acts. Obviously, the desirable
result of protecting the misled transferee could be more readily
achieved if the Code was unencumbered with the "actual knowledge" rule. This would simply require holding the unnoted restriction to be ineffective as to the purchaser, regardless of the informa-

ss. u.c.c. § 1-103.
89. U.C.C. § 8-401-(l)(c) &: (e).
90. It might be argued that technically a purchaser had no "actual knowledge"
of a restriction if information to that effect, albeit true, had been specifically negated
by authoritative representations.
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tion which he received and which was subsequently denied. However, this is not enough to support a conclusion that the "actual
knowledge" concept should be deleted. For one thing, it offends
fairness to permit a person to trample on others' rights of which
he is aware: he has the opportunity to take action which would
protect those rights, and he should at least take subject to them.
An even more compelling situation justifying the Code provision for validating effective, though unnoted, restrictions arises in
the case of transfer restrictions which are intended to preserve a
securities act exemption. It may be impracticable to force a prospective purchaser of securities in an exempt transaction to accept a
certificate with a legend restricting transfer. 91 The issuer may have
to take some risk of losing the exemption and protect itself with
an "investment letter" as well as a stop transfer notice of which
the purchaser is informed.92 Suppose that a purchaser of securities
under such restrictions disregards his representations in the investment letter and sells the restricted securities under circumstances
which may cause the issuer to lose his exemption. If the sale is
through the organized markets, assuming that the unsuspecting
selling broker sends the indorsed certificate to the transfer agent,
then the stop transfer notice will be triggered, registration of transfer will be refused, and the certificate will be returned to the broker
and thence to the seller. The seller is a "person with actual knowledge" of the unnoted restriction, that is, of the stop transfer notice,93
91. Refusal to take a certificate with a restrictive legend does not necessarily
show that the purchaser is taking the security "with a view to distribution" instead
of with the required intent of investment for an indefinite period of time. On the
contrary, several factors, in no way inconsistent with an investment purpose, can ex•
plain such a refusal. For example, changed circumstances may require a premature
sale, and the purchaser may wish to avoid the delay involved in obtaining an unre•
stricted certificate from the corporation. Similarly, the fact that a restricted certificate
may be unacceptable as collateral for a loan may underlie a purchaser's reluctance to
accept a restricted certificate.
92. An investment letter is merely a writing, in no prescribed form, in which the
purchaser states that, as of the time of purchase, he intends to hold the security for
investment, and that he is not purchasing it with a view to distribution. The Securities
and Exchange Commission, however, has stressed that an "investment letter" is no
defense to an issuer faced with loss of its exemption because of a sale in violation of
the terms upon which the exemption was granted. Securities Act Release No. 33-4552,
at 3 (S.E.C. Nov. 6, 1962). A stop transfer notice with respect to a designated security
remains with the issuer or its transfer agent, and if the certificate as to which such a
notice applies comes in for registration of transfer, the issuer or transfer agent will post•
pone or refuse such registration. Thus an investment letter coupled with a stop transfer
notice is an effective combination enabling the issuer to control transfers and thus pro•
tect the securities act exemption under which it made the original sales. The text indicates why this combination works so well.
93. I assume that the issuer informed the purchaser in the exempt transaction that
a stop transfer notice affecting his certificate would be placed on file. Without such
notification, the purchaser would not have "actual knowledge" of the restriction, and
consequently, the restriction would not be effective against him,
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and the restriction is good against him, as indeed it should be.94
He must now, if he can, satisfy the issuer that the security may be
sold without violating the law; this may mean securing opinions
of counsel that such sale would not affect the status of the exemption
or perhaps a no action letter or informal advice from the SEC.
Thus, the actual knowledge phrase, narrowly construed, is an indispensable supplement to the general rule requiring conspicuous
notation. It establishes a means by which issuers, who are unable to
make use of the more rigid forms of transfer restrictions which are
noted on the certificate, may protect themselves from wrongful transfers.

B. Scope of the Transfer Restriction Provision
The Code section in terms, governs only those transfer restrictions which are "imposed by the issuer," 95 and thus it does not
apply to restraints which are imposed by shareholder agreements
or other arrangements in which the issuer is not involved even
though the purpose and effect of these arrangements may be identical. It is unclear why the Code, which supposedly aims at the maximum feasible coverage, fails to carry forward the rule in the broader
form in which it appeared in the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. 96
Arguably, the Code's casus omissus was motivated by a desire to
preserve the privacy of shareholder agreements which would be
lost if any transfer restrictions which they impose must be "noted
conspicuously" on the certificate. Another possible rationale is
that the variety of non-issuer transfer restrictions is so great, and
the incidental problems so varied, that it is better to leave private
restrictions to case-law development.
The reasons for enlarging coverage seem more compelling. The
privacy of shareholder-imposed restrictions, if this be a desideratum,
simply cannot be maintained in fact. Transferees of restricted securities will inevitably learn of them, and, depending upon their prior
knowledge of the restrictions, the transferees will or will not be
bound by them. Moreover, corporation statutes are beginning to
require certificate notations of various provisions which may sub94. It could possibly be argued that an investment letter alone constitutes a "restriction imposed by the issuer," of which the purchaser who gave the letter had "actual
knowledge," but I find this argument unpersuasive. First, it overextends the concept
of a "restriction imposed by the issuer," since the letter is presumably a result of the
purchaser's voluntary act, even though it may have been the only way in which he
could get the security. Second, it violates the policy of strictly construing stock transfer
restrictions.
95. u.c.c. § 8-204.
96. UNIFORM SroCK TRANSFER Acr § 15.
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ject purchasers to unexpected burdens or obligations.97 Thus, the
arguments from a supposed "right of privacy" run counter to the
trend toward the mandatory disclosure of all relevant restrictions
on securities. Even if the secrecy of shareholder agreements could
be more effectively protected than is now possible, this would be
undesirable. The policy favoring free transferability of securities
logically dictates that restrictions be noted whether exacted by the
issuer or by "private" agreements. Whoever imposes them, undisclosed restrictions violate the fundamental assumption under which
investment securities move about in today's markets.
A clearcut rule, which comprehensively covers all transfer restrictions, would promote certainty. In particular, it would adequately protect the interests of both those who impose transfer
restrictions and those who may be subject to them. In the case of
"privately" imposed restrictions, there is every reason to give the
bona fide purchaser without notice the right, which is clearly defined
in the Code, to take free and clear of undisclosed limitations on the
marketability of the purchased securities. Such considerations seem
especially compelling since Article Eight purports to be a comprehensive codification of the rules and customs which govern securities.
The expansion of the Code's limited rule can easily be achieved
by deleting those words confining section 8-204 to restrictions "imposed by the issuer" and transferring the reworded section from
part two of Article Eight, which governs issuance and issuers, to
part one, which contains the general provisions of the Article. The
new section would read as follows:
Unless noted conspicuously on the security, any restriction on transfer even though otherwise lawful is ineffective except against a person
with actual knowledge of it.

IV.

REGISTERING TRANSFER: THE ISSUER'S DUTIES,
PRIVILEGES AND LIABILITIES

Transfers of registered-form securities are subject to certain
special rules of Article Eight, which represent the first general attempt to codify issuer duties and liabilities in registering transfer
of securities.98 The Code objective is to simplify and expedite regis97. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 6O9(h), 616(c), 62O(g) &: 10O2(c) (McKinney 1963).
98. The Uniform Act for the Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers offered
substantial protection to issuers registering transfers of fiduciary-owned securities, but
it has not been adopted in all states. The Code provisions in part 4 of Article Eight
essentially follow the rules established by the Simplification Act and apply them in the
registration of transfers of all securities. For an excellent article dealing with various
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tration of transfer by requiring the issuer to register transfer when
certain specified conditions are fulfilled and, at the same time, by
carefully circumscribing the issuer's liability.99 The basic concept
is this: if a security has been indorsed by an "appropriate person"100
whose signature has been responsibly vouched for, 101 then a bona
fide purchaser may have the security registered into his name even
if its transfer was "wrongful" 102 (for example, in breach of trust),103
and the issuer is no longer liable to the true owner for thus divesting
him of his record title to the security.104 If, however, the indorsement is unauthorized105 (for example, a forgery), then even a bona
fide purchaser is denied registration of transfer of the security,
despite an indorsement by an "appropriate person" and a signature
guarantee. 106 If the issuer does register transfer on a forged signature,
it remains absolutely liable to the true owner, and must restore
the security (or its equivalent) to him. 107 If the issuer is thus held
liable, its recourse is against the signature guarantor, normally a
financially responsible institution. However, the purchaser who has
been refused registration of transfer because of a forgery also has
rights against the signature guarantor, whose warranties run "to
any person taking or dealing with the security in reliance on the
guarantee . . . ." 108 Since Code rights and liabilities tum in large
part upon the signature guarantee, it is obviously of great importance, especially to transfer agents but also to selling brokers, that
the guarantee itself is genuine and that the guarantor is sufficiently
responsible financially to meet any liabilities, which are potentially
quite large, that might arise out of the particular transaction. Subject to refinements and qualifications, this is the nexus of legal rules
within which the registration of transfer procedure works smoothly
for the multitude of daily securities transactions.
facets of this subject, see Conard, A New Deal for Fiduciaries' Stock Transfers, 56
L. REv. 843 (1958).

MICH.

99. The Code rules as to the duties, privileges, and liabilities of an issuer in registering security transfers apply also to transfer agents, registrars, or others who act for the
issuer. See U.C.C. §§ 8-201(3) & 8-406.
100. The phrase, "appropriate person," is defined in § 8-308(3) as conesponding
roughly to the named owner of the security.
101. See U.C.C. § 8-312 for the effect of the signature guarantee which may be required by the issuer as a condition to registration of transfer pursuant to §§ 8-40l(l)(b)
& 8-402(l)(a).
102. u.c.c. § 8-401.
103. See especially U.C.C. § 8-403(3).
104. u.c.c. § 8-404(1).
105. "Unauthorized" is defined in § 1-201(43).
106. u.c.c. §§ 8-311 & 8-401(1).
107. u.c.c. § 8-404(2).
108. u.c.c. § 8-312(3).
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A. The Issuer's Duty To Register Transfer and Liabilities for
Wrongfully Registering or Refusing To Register Transfer
The issuer must register transfer if, among other conditions, an
"appropriate person" has indorsed, the indorsements are guaranteed
to be "genuine and effective," the issuer has no duty to inquire or
has discharged that duty, and the transfer is "rightful or is to a
bona fide purchaser." 109 Given these conditions, the issuer is liable
for any loss which results from unreasonable delay or from failure
or refusal to register.11° The ease of statement of these rules conceals a variety of difficulties and uncertainties.

I. When Is the Issuer Privileged Not To Register Transfer?
In at least two situations, apart from non-compliance with the
four conditions noted above, the issuer may refuse to register transfers. First, a stop transfer notice in the issuer's records allows it to
suspend registration pending investigation of the "adverse claim"
stated in the notice.111 Second, if it knows or suspects that a necessary indorsement is unauthorized, it could certainly delay registration pending inquiry, or it could refuse registration entirely if
it is satisfied that there is a forgery.11 2 In other situations, however, the Code rules are harder to fathom.
(A) Suppose that the issuer has no duty to investigate adverse
claims since it has neither received a stop transfer notice nor demanded excess documentation which would give it constructive
notice of a wrongful transfer.11 8 The issuer has no knowledge or
information as to whether the presenter is a bona fide purchaser
or whether the transfer is rightful. It has only a certificate which
is duly indorsed by the appropriate person with a signature guarantee by a reputable institution. Assume that, in fact, the transfer
is wrongful, that the presenter knows this,114 and that such facts
would be discovered if the issuer inquired. Clearly, the purchaser
could not enforce registration of transfer; equally clearly, the
issuer is not liable if it does register transfer in its ignorance. Yet,
109. u.c.c. § 8-401(1).
110. u.c.c. § 8-401(2).
111. U.C.C. § 8-403(2) spells out a clear-cut method which issuers are likely to follow.
112. This is implied in §§ 8-401 8c 3-404.
113. The Code seeks to dissuade issuers and transfer agents from continuing to demand excessive documentation by charging issuers with notice of "all matters" contained
in such documents. U.C.C. § 8-402(4). The lesson is clearly that ignorance is the better
part of prudence. But cf. Conard, supra note 98, at 860-61, criticizing the Code approach
in this regard.
114. The presence of knowledge precludes this purchaser from obtaining bona fide
purchaser status. U.C.C. § 8-302.
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could the issuer, under circumstances which impose upon it no
statutory duty to inquire, adopt a policy of routinely investigating
the rightfulness of transfer or of the presenter's bona fide purchaser status? Although the old law in effect compelled just this
sort of investigation, under the Code the issuer should not pursue
such a policy. Granted, in this precise fact situation, the delayindeed, a flat refusal-would be "privileged" since the presenter
could not enforce registration. This, however, is the luck of the
draw. The same issuer who safely refused registration on this occasion likely would be liable in other situations for "unreasonable
delay in registration" as he pursued his private policy of policing
transfers. Such inquiry would run contrary to the Code policy of
expediting registration and is thus severely discouraged by the Code
provisions. 115 The issuer should gratefully accept the protection
tendered him and not undertake to do more than the Code requires.
(B) Suppose that an issuer is presented with a request to register
transfer of a trustee-owned security. The issuer scrupulously observes
the Code policy discouraging demands for excess documentation,
and no stop transfer notice is outstanding. Nevertheless, as it routinely checks out the trustee's incumbency from documents permitted by the Code, 116 it accidentally, but unmistakably, discovers
the transfer to be in breach of trust (for example, transfer is expressly forbidden by the trust instrument or there is no court
approval despite its being expressly required). If the presenter is
not a bona fide purchaser, there clearly is no enforceable duty to
register transfer, and the issuer could lawfully refuse. However, if
the presenter is a bona fide purchaser, a refusal to register would
probably give him a right of action against the issuer. Given the
presenter's uncertain status as a bona fide purchaser in the eyes
of the issuer and the evident wrongfulness of the transfer, the
issuer should be privileged to refuse participation in consummating
such a wrongful transaction.117 The desirable approach, however,
is not a flat refusal to register, but a delay to investigate further.
Although the Code does not deal with this precise situation, it does
115. u.c.c. §§ 8-402(4) & 8-403(1)(b).
116. U.C.C. § 8-402{l){c) permits the issuer to require "appropriate evidence of ap-

pointment" of a fiduciary.
117. Welland Inv. Corp. v. First Nat'l .Bank, 81 N.J. Super. 180, 195 A.2d 210 (Ch.
1963) involved a transfer agent's refusal to register transfer of stock certificates where
the sale would have violated the Securities Act of 1933. The precise nature of the restriction, whether a legend on the certificate or a stop transfer notice or both, is not
stated in the court's opinion. The court approved the transfer agent's refusal to register
transfer since the bona fide purchaser status of the purchaser was disputed, and denied
summary judgment for the purchaser on that ground.
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state that the issuer may discharge "any duty of inquiry by any
reasonable means" including the use of a stop transfer notice. 118
The safest approach would be to follow this procedure and defer
registration for the permitted thirty-day period which would not be
an "unreasonable delay" creating liability.119
(C) Suppose that the issuer receives a transferred security which
impeccably complies with the conditions for registration. However, it refused to register transfer because the transferor, a dominant figure in the issuer's management or among its shareholders,
tries to veto the transaction-perhaps because the value of the
securities has unexepectedly risen over the sale price-by placing
a stop transfer notice between sale and presentment. Presumably
the issuer must check out the "adverse claim." But is the delay
privileged? Although the Code impliedly permits a "reasonable
delay"-thirty days in the case of the stop transfer order-the
purpose of this particular delay seems indefensible, since it results
from a maneuver by a dominant figure using his control over the
issuer to serve personal ends. Arguably, the issuer has acted (or has
been forced to act) in bad faith and without reasonable grounds
if the personal motives of officers or shareholders prompt its refusal
or delay. Accordingly, the issuer probably would be liable for lending its strategic position and powers to further the interests of one
claimant as against another. In short, an issuer's fiduciary duty
running to the presenter should limit its privilege to refuse or delay
registration of transfer. Under the Code, this might be worked out
through the general requirement of "good faith" 120 defined rather
limitedly as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."121 It is arguable that this definition is too narrow to permit
finding a breach of duty where an issuer or transfer agent aids
one claimant in effecting a dubious power play. However, it is
probably the most solid ground, under the Code, to attack such a
manifest impropriety.122
118. U.C.C. § 8-403(2). Strictly speaking, this provision applies only when there is a
"duty of inquiry" which in turn arises only from the two situations noted in § 8-403(1).
119. See U.C.C. § 8-401(2).
120. An obligation of "good faith" applies to every transaction. U.C.C. § 1-203.
121. u.c.c. § 1-201(19).
122. The text example closely follows the facts in Kanton v. United States Plastics,
Inc., 248 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J. 1965). This was not, strictly speaking, a Code case, since
the Code was in effect in the forum state (New Jersey) and enacted but not at that time
effective in the state whose law governed the disposition of the case (Florida). However,
the court "prophesied" as to how Florida would decide the case in the future and used
both Code and pre-Code law to hold that the transfer agent's refusal to register was
wrongful, and that the issuer acted in bad faith and without reasonable grounds in
refusing to register transfer where the personal interests of a controlling shareholder

.,
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2. When Is the Issuer Privileged To Register Transfer?
The Code imposes on the issuer duties to register with liabilities
running both to the true owner for certain wrongful registrations
and to the presenter for improper refusals or delays in registering.
When does the issuer have some discretion, without incurring liability, to delay registration or to proceed promptly with the task?
Under example (A) in the preceding section, the issuer clearly must
register transfer and not poke about for some reason to hold up
registration.
In example (B), when registration of transfer was questioned
because of inadvertently obtained but reliable information as to
the wrongfulness of a transfer, it was concluded that the issuer is
privileged to defer registration pending an investigation. However, could a hard-nosed issuer simply ignore these facts, stand on
the absence of a stop transfer notice, and register transfer into the
purchaser's name without liability? I believe that it could do so even
without inquiring into the presenter's bona fide purchaser status.
Literally read, section 8-404(1) bars liability to the true owner if
the security carries the necessary indorsements--and we assume
that it does-and the issuer is not obligated to investigate adverse
claims. Under section 8-403, the duty of inquiry arises only from two
circumstances: timely receipt of a stop transfer notice or receipt
of information of an adverse claim from additional documentation
which the issuer is entitled to require under section 8-402(4). Nothing in section 8-403 indicates that an investigation is to be compelled
by the mere possession of facts which impugn the rightfulness of
transfer, and the thrust of the Code's policy supports this result. If
the possession of facts ipso facto (other than those received under
the transfer notice or from excess documentation) requires investigation on the pain of liability of the issuer to the true owner, an
issuer, who has suspicions that are more or less well grounded, could
not safely ignore any information and would feel compelled to inquire. This would subvert efforts to simplify security transfers and
ease the issuer's liability, and would return about half-way to the
older law imposing broad duties of inquiry. Arguably, the pervading
obligation to act in "good faith" 123 might require investigation
under these facts, but I think not for reasons later considered.124
prompted the refusal. I have discussed the case in detail in a note at 44 N.C.L. REv. 854
(1966).
12!1. u.c.c. § 1-20!1.
124. See text preceding note 126 infra.
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In example (C), when an issuer refused or delayed registration
on the demand of a controlling shareholder-seller who sought to
block registration for assumed personal motives, we concluded that
the issuer's act was improper. However, could the issuer (or a
transfer agent) go ahead and promptly register transfer without
liability to the objecting seller? Assuming the issuer's willingness
to flaunt the "request" of a dominant management figure, it likely
would escape liability under section 8-404 since the security is
properly indorsed. Once the issuer has determined that transfer
registration is being held up to further a seller's personal interests,
the issuer has discharged any duty of further inquiry-assuming,
indeed, that a demand from the claimant for such a dubious purpose
created any duty. Registering transfer under these circumstances,
although risky, would probably be privileged.
A final example, example (D),125 goes to the scope of the "good
faith," which under the Code must pervade every transaction. Assume a corporation with 500 shareholders, all of whom are scattered
small owners except for a controlling block held by a trustee for several beneficiaries. The corporation does its own transfer work. The
shares are traded from time to time on local over-the-counter markets.
On a particular day, a number of trust-owned share certificates come
in duly and genuinely indorsed by the trustee (an "appropriate
person") with proper signature guarantees, and other authenticating
documents. The transfer clerk (I) knows the trustee socially, (2)
knows for a fact that he is an active stock market trader, (3) has
heard rumors that the trustee personally lost heavily during the
1966 bear market, and (4) has heard on good authority that the
trustee is in Mexico. There are no stop transfer notices nor has
the issuer sought excess· documentation. Can the issuer honor the
demands of the purchasers and their agents presenting the shares
for registration of transfer? No one can assert a priori that an agent
possessing such information acts in bad faith by registering transfer into the purchasers' names. Nonetheless, I think that the issuer
must, under these circumstances, investigate in order to protect
the true owners, and that only in this way can it act "honestly in
fact." Moreover, to one who is calculating possible losses, the risk of
liability for the delay which is needed to make the inquiry is much
less than the risk of a much heavier liability for divesting the trust
and its beneficiaries of title to the shares. Thus, the best approach
125. This illustration was suggested to me by the slightly different example in
Israels, Investmi;nt Serurities Problems-Article 8 of the UCC, 11 How. L.J. 120, 140-41
~1965~.
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is to decline to register transfer immediately, pending an investigation. If sued by the purchaser~ for undue delay, the issuer may
anticipate judicial sympathy for its reluctance to act peremptorily
in such dubious circumstances.
This example highlights the difficulty inherent in the "good
faith" test. The Code seeks to minimize burdensome duties of inquiry in order to facilitate security transfers to avoid delays and
added expenses to transferees. That objective is frustrated if, under
the guise of "good faith," the issuer is required to track down bits
and pieces of information incidentally or accidentally acquired or
to determine the presenter's bona fide purchaser status whenever the
issuer suspects the transfer to be wrongful. Such investigations into
potentially complicated and disputed factual matters are precisely
what issuers and transfer agents should be able to avoid, and to
require obliquely these inquiries revives the evils of the old law
which compelled issuers to police security transfers. The "good
faith" requirement should be invoked only in extreme and unusual circumstances. Thus, it would permit delay in example (D)
but not in example (B); and I believe it could also be used to
ground the issuer's fiduciary duty in example (C). Although the
"good faith" test is basically a subjective one, in my view, it still
must incorporate an objective component: that conduct which others
who are skilled in the field would regard as decent and honest in the
particular situation. Prevailing standards and attitudes should be
respected both by the courts in determining "good faith" and by the
issuers when they are confronted with an unusual and potentially
explosive situation. However, "good faith" should be invoked spar- ·
ingly so that issuers and transfer agents may safely rely on the reasonably clear-cut Code guidelines for performing their duties in registering securities transfers.

B. Overissue of Securities
Occasionally Article Eight, despite its generally forward-looking
approach, retreats into earlier times, genuflecting as it goes, to
ancient rules having an almost totemic character. The most conspicuous instance of this is the Code's tortured treatment of the
problem of overissue of securities.126 It enshrines not only the long
established proposition that an issue of shares in excess of the
number authorized by the charter is "void" and a "nulE~y,"12 1 but
126. u.c.c. § 8-104.
127. Railway Co. v. Allerton, 85 U.S. 233 (17 Wall.) (1873); New York, N.H. & H. RR.
v. Schuyler, 34 N.Y. 30 (Ct. App. 1865),
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also the concomitant but subordinate doctrine that overissued shares
may not be cured even by retroactively amending the charter.128
New securities could be authorized and exchanged for the void overissue, although this would raise certain problems under existing law
as to whether the old exchanged "void" shares are lawful consideration for the new "valid" issue. The Code's ritualistic deference is
mildly absurd; it is not tragic, however, since the overissue question
is not one over which a revolution (or even a Happening) can be
staged.129 Yet it does deserve exposure in the hope that a more rational approach may be forthcoming.
Apart from a deliberate charter violation, there is always a
possibility that an issuer might be compelled to recognize both the
bona fide purchaser of the security as well as the true owner, and
that as a consequence an overissue could result. For instance, the
issuer may be required both to issue a certificate to the bona fide
purchaser for 100 shares and, because it negligently ignored the
stop transfer notice on its records, also to issue a certificate to the
true owner for 100 shares. 130 Thus, 200 shares would be outstanding
where only 100 were before. A similar situation could arise when
a certificate is apparently lost, stolen, or destroyed, and a replacement
certificate is issued, and subsequently the missing certificate turns
up. 181 Thus, in several instances, compulsory validation of securities
could create an overissue.
Under a rational approach, issuers would have to validate securities in these circumstances regardless of an overissue in order to
protect both the innocent purchaser and the true owners. This
could be implemented by a statutory provision to the following
effect: Whatever the charter says about the number of authorized
shares, any additional number may be issued to validate an overissue without securing a shareholder-approved amendment. This
proposed provision would not violate policies underlying the old
rule against overissue-protection against dilution of the outstanding share interests and against manipulation of the share structure.
First, the likelihood of this form of manipulation, given all the
others that are available to those so inclined, is too slight to matter;
128. Triplex Shoe Co. v. Rice &: Hutchins, 17 Del. Ch. 356, 152 At!. 342 (Sup. Ct.
1930).
129. In the larger corporation there is at least an independent transfer agent, and
more often, both a transfer agent and a registrar. The latter maintains a close watch on
the relation between the total shares outstanding and the total number of authorized
shares. The New York Stock Exchange rules require both a separate transfer agent and
a registrar for securities listed on the ".Big Board."
130. u.c.c. § 8-404(2).
131. u.c.c. § 8-405(2).
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but if it did happen, the wrongdoing parties could be called to account. Second, substantial dilution of outstanding interests is also
unlikely, but such dilution could as well occur if the corporation had
to recognize two shareholders for one and had the authorized but unissued shares to do so. The problem, then, is not one peculiar to overissue. In addition, although compulsory validation of overissue
might be harmful in a close corporation whose carefully devised
balance of control might be upset, in this environment share transfers are relatively less frequent, some form of restriction on transfer
usually is present, and the pertinent facts are likely to be known.
Thus, there is no real barrier to validating overissues by statutory
provision.
In lieu of this simple approach, the Code requires the corporation to purchase and deliver "an identical security which does not
constitute an overissue"132 and, if no such security is "immediately
available for purchase," then to respond to the wronged security
holder in damages.183 However, there are difficulties here. Assuming
a supply of securities which is "reasonably available for purchase,"
the corporation may be financially unable to purchase the shares.
This financial difficulty may be due to many things, for example,
indenture requirements for maintaining a specified cash position
or limiting the purchase of shares, or perhaps, corporation law
restrictions on the accounts out of which share purchases may be
made. 184 No corporation law provision for share repurchases expressly recognizes the small but knotty problem these restrictions
could pose, and certainly the Code does not. If the Code continues
to stick to this procedure, corporation statutes should, in the case
of stock acquisitions to validate an overissue, remove the normal
limitations on use of corporate funds just as they do with regard
to the corporate purchase of a shareholder's interest under the appraisal remedy. 135
The Code provision has another complication. Assuming shares
which are "reasonably available for purchase," and the existence of
lawful corporate funds with which to make the purchase, the Code
states that the holder of the overissue "may compel the issuer to
purchase and deliver" the clean security. 136 Does this ambiguous
phrase "may compel" mean that the holder has an option either to
compel the purchase of a new security or to pursue some other, un132.
133.
134.
135.
Jll6.

U.C.C. § 8-104(l)(a).
u.c.c. § 8-104(1).
E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 513(a) (McKinney 1963).
E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 513(b)(3) (McKinney 1963).
U.C.C. § 8-104(l)(a).
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defined, remedy, such as the traditional remedy of damages? Assuming that the damage option is not pre-empted by a remedy of compulsory substitute purchase, the measure of damage is uncertain.
Since, by hypothesis, the security is "reasonably available," clearly
the measure of damages stated in section 8-104(1)(b) is inapplicable,
since it applies only to securities not "reasonably available for
purchase." If the Code is to pursue the section 8-104(1)(b) approach,
it should have made clear that, if the security is "reasonably available," purchase is the exclusive remedy. Since the security holder's
original intention was to obtain (and hold) the security, his reasonable expectations are fulfilled if his sole remedy is to get a "clean"
security.
The Code remedy where the identical security is not available
for purchase is recovery of the price which the security holder or
the last purchaser for value paid for it with interest. Although
intended to settle the case-law muddle over the measure of damages
and to prevent speculation, this rule produces some curious results
which, in fact, have just the opposite effect.187 The upshot is that
the overissue remedy is one of the less effective provisions of Article Eight, and that consequently it should be eliminted in favor
of the clearcut and simple remedy of validation of overissued
securities.188
137. Suppose that A purchases part of a new stock issue at 20 in 1964 not knowing
that his shares constituted part of an overissue. He learns of the defect in 1965 and
demands that the corporation furnish him with a security which is not part of the overissue, but such a security is not "reasonably available for purchase." Under § 8-104(l)(b),
he may "recover from the issuer the price he or the last purchaser for value paid for
it••••" Suppose that, at the time of A's demand to the issuer, the shares are worth 10,
whereas the last purchaser for value paid 14. If A can enforce his demand, he has a
nice advantage over shareholders who received no part of the overissue, because he receives at least $14.00-the price paid by the last purchaser for value. True, he has suffered a loss of $6.00, but the other shareholders have a paper loss of $10.00. The tables
are turned, however, if the shares A bought in 1964 at 20 are now worth 50, with the
last purchaser for value having paid 45. Under the Code rule, the corporation need only
pay A $45.00 at a time when the shares are worth $50.00. Thus, while he has a "gain"
of $25.00 per share, the other shareholders have a paper profit of $30.00 per share. Obviously, A would prefer to have shares rather than the $45.00, especially if the stock is
rising in value.
138. Some of the uncertainties in the present Code provision-bad as it is in concept
-could be clarified by revising the language of§ 8-104(l)(a) & (b) as follows:
(a) if an identical security which does not constitute an overissue is reasonably
available for purchase, or is otherwise available for delivery, the exclusive
remedy of the person entitled to issue or validation shall be to compel the
issuer to deliver or purchase and deliver such a security to him against surrender of the security, if any, which he holds;
(b) if a security is not so available for purchase, or otherwise available for delivery, the person entitled to issue or validation may recover from the issuer the
fair value of an identical security which does not constitute an overissue with
interest from the date of his demand.
(New material in italics.)
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C. The Code and the Simplification Act
The Uniform Commercial Code continues in force the Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers, and
indeed makes the latter's provisions controlling in the event of inconsistency.139 The reason for so doing is unclear, since Article Eight
of the Code seemingly adopts all of the Simplification Act provisions, admittedly with some language changes, and generalizes them
into rules applicable to all security transfers and not just to fiduciary
transactions. Thus, there appears to be no conflict between the two
statutes on substantive questions. However, the parallel effectiveness of the two statutes raises a vexing problem. The Simplification
Act is permissive; it purports to relieve issuers and transfer agents
of the old common-law duty of policing the rightfulness of security
transfers by fully investigating any proposed transfer of record of a
fiduciary-owned security. Although the Code adopts the concepts
of the Simplification Act, it is clearly much more than a merely permissive enactment. First, section 8-401 establishes the judicially enforceable duty of a transfer agent or issuer to register transfer of
securities under precisely stated circumstances,140 and it also defines
and limits their liabilities when they have fulfilled that duty. 141
Thus, if a fiduciary security transfer is presented for registration
and complies with the Code requirements-and thereby with the
similar requirements of the Simplification Act-the transfer agent
must act. Second, the Code affirmatively discourages transfer agents
from seeking "excess" documentation as to the rightfulness of a
transfer. For if they demand more than the Code calls for, they are
considered to have constructive notice of everything contained in
those "excess" documents which bears upon the rightfulness of the
transfers, for example, non-compliance with the terms of a controlling instrument or court order or other breaches of trust.142
Thus, the transfer agent can become liable to the true owner if he
registers such a wrongful transfer. 143 The Simplification Act contains no such sanction.
Probably the Code draftsmen decided to continue the Simplification Act in force because it has become familiar to transfer agents
in many states. It is also more comfortable for this cautious breed
of people to work with a statute using their customary language
139. u.c.c. § 10-104(2).
140. U.C.C. § 8-401(2) states the duty, while § 8-401(1), together with §§ 8-402 &: 8-403,
delimit the circumstances creating the duty.
141. u.c.c. § 8-404.
142. U.C.C. §§ 8-402(4) &: 8-403(I)(b).
143. u.c.c. § 8-404.
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rather than the new and somewhat artificial (although more accurate) Code terminology.144 Thus, while the purpose was presumably benign, the relation between Code and Act is cloudy.
Surely the Code draftsmen did not intend to relieve transfer agents
and issuers of Code-imposed duties by giving strict priority to the
Simplification Act's permissive provisions. Yet the saving clause
contained in the Code can be construed as subordinating these
duties, even though this construction does violence to Article Eight's
objectives. For example, it would undermine the Code sanctions
against requiring undue documentation if transfer agents could
continue the old practices on the ground that the apparently overriding provisions of the Simplification Act lacked any such sanctions.
Thus the Code's clause saving the effectiveness of the Simplification Act contains a serious ambiguity. It is hoped that the courts
will read it as giving pre-eminence to the Simplification Act only
on those matters of substance as to which there is clear conflict,
but not as relieving issuers and transfer agents of the specific duties
and sanctions of the Code. Such a construction is reasonable. It can
fairly be said that there is no "inconsistency" between the Code's
duties and sanctions and the mere silence of the Simplification Act
as to such duties and sanctions, but that the Code-a later and more
refined statute-supplements the Act with certain additional provisions needed to implement the common purposes of the Code and
the Act. Only on this reading can full effect be accorded to the
Code's evident intention to put teeth into its efforts to simplify
registration of transfer. Nevertheless, it would probably be a better
solution to eliminate the saving clause altogether and repeal the
Simplification Act; if this is unacceptable, the saving clause should
be reworded to make clear that the duties, liabilities, and sanctions
contained in Article Eight are effective even though the Simplification Act remains in force.
144. E.g., one who "transfers" a security (under the Code), "assigns" it (Simplification
Act and transfer-agent-lingo), while when a transfer agent or issuer "registers transfer"
of a security (Code), he simply "transfers" it (Simplification Act) or-to complicate
matters further-transfers it "of record" so that the transferee becomes a "holder of
record" (typical corporation statute).

